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There  is  evidence  that  some  multi-person  households  may  withhold  income  transfers,  such  as 
bonuses, gifts, and cash transfers, from other members of the household (Ashraf (2009); Vogler and 
Pahl, (1994)). In this paper, I show that the incentives to hide income under incomplete information 
regarding the quantity of resources available to the household differ for three different household 
resource management structures. I illustrate this with a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, one 
spouse receives a monetary transfer that is unobserved by her spouse, and she must decide whether 
to reveal or to hide it. In the second stage, spouses bargain over the allocation of resources between 
a  household  good  and  private  expenditure.  The  three  models  differ  in  the  resource  allocation 
mechanism  that takes place in  second stage of the  game:  housekeeping  allowance, independent 
management, and joint management. Results indicate that when one spouse receives a monetary 
transfer that is unobservable to her spouse, hiding is more likely to occur in households with a 
housekeeping  allowance  contract,  compared  to  independent  or  joint  management.  In  joint 
management households, however, a spouse may hide in equilibrium if the change in bargaining 
power associated with revealing the transfer is not significant enough to compensate for the loss in 
discretionary expenditure. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Households are characterized by two main forms of interdependence between members: household 
public goods and caring, or how much one‘s welfare is affected by the other‘s. Household public 
goods can be thought of as those that benefit all members independently of who provides them, for 
instance investment in children‘s human capital, such as education and health, provides welfare to 
both spouses even if it is the mother that makes sure her child gets the proper nutrition. It is often 
argued that, because families involve long-term, repeated interaction and caring, households will realize 
there  are  opportunities  for  Pareto  improvement  and  therefore  cooperation  will  evolve  over  time 
(Browning, et al., (2008)). However, these opportunities may diminish if information asymmetries exist 
and one spouse is able to exploit his or her information advantage without fear of detection.  
Empirical studies on household bargaining, however, have found results consistent with non-
cooperative  behavior  and  inefficient  allocation  of  resources  within  the  household,  which  implies 
household public goods are being underprovided (Udry, (1996); Chen (2009); de Laat (2009); Ashraf, 
(2009)).  Under-investment  in  household  public  goods,  such  as  child  human  capital,  has 
consequences on economic growth, welfare and can generate poverty traps. There is evidence that 
inadequate nutrition in childhood affects long-term physical development, as well as cognitive skills 
which in turn affect productivity later in life (Duflo, (2001)). Returns to education tend to be higher 
in developing countries and depend both on investment in educational attainment and in health due 
to the effects on productivity associated with proper nutrition. These human capital investments 
have important spillover effects in a household‘s ability to step out of poverty because they increase 
child  productivity  providing  higher  and  alternative  sources  of  income  diversification  to  the 
household, in addition to the fertility effects through the trade-off of quality versus quantity of 
children, which also fosters economic development (Duflo, (2001); Rosenzweig, (1990)).  2 
 
Cultural  norms  and  informal  institutions  may  create  incentives  for  underinvestment  in 
household public goods, because they determine the household resource management system and each 
spouse‘s control over resources (Hoffman, (2009), Duflo and Udry, (2004); Anderson and Baland, 
(2002)). For instance, Duflo and Udry (2004) find that, in Cote d‘Ivoire, only the proceeds from yam 
production are allocated towards child human capital investments, whereas farm income from other 
men and women controlled crops is used for the owner‘s private expenditures. Thus, if there is a 
negative  shock  affecting  yam  production,  the  decrease  in  the  amount  allocated  towards  child 
investments will not necessarily be compensated with resources coming from other sources. Anderson 
and Baland (2002) find that in poor households in Kenya men withhold a proportion of their income 
because it is commonly believed that they have the right to personal spending money. Hoffman 
(2009) finds that in Uganda, where Malaria is widespread, women when given cash to buy mosquito 
nets will use them on themselves because they perceive that by purchasing the nets they are buying 
usage rights, whereas when the nets are given to women for free they use them on their children.  
There is a substantial sociological literature on the processes of intra-household decision 
making which emphasizes the importance of financial management structures in the family and the 
role that information can play in making decisions within a marriage (Wooley, (2001); Pahl (1994)). 
The  information  environment  can  cause  further  underinvestment  in  household  public  goods 
because  cooperation  may  render  unsustainable  (Chen,  (2009);  De  Laat,  (2008);  Udry,  (1996)). 
Further, there is evidence that some multi-person households may withhold income transfers, such 
as bonuses, gifts, and cash transfers, from other members of the household. Vogley and Pahl (1994) 
find that husbands prefer bonuses to being paid for extra hours because they are able to maintain 
discretion  on  the  way  those  additional  resources  are  allocated.  Ashraf  (2009)  finds  that  in  the 
Philippines, when there is no fear of detection, husbands will withhold a monetary transfer from 
their wives and spend it on their private consumption. Income withholding has the potential to 3 
 
cause poverty traps because children education and nutrition are goods that can easily be monitored, 
thus a spouse wishing to hide income would be forced to allocate those resources elsewhere in order 
to avoid detection and opportunities to step out of poverty will not be fully realized.  
In what follows I show that the incentives to hide income under incomplete information 
regarding the quantity of resources available to the household differ for three different household 
resource management structures. I illustrate this with a simple two-stage game. In the first stage, one 
spouse receives a monetary transfer that is unobserved by her spouse, and she must decide whether 
to reveal or to hide it. In the second stage, spouses bargain over the allocation of resources between 
a  household  good  and  private  expenditure.  I  develop  three  models  that  differ  on  the  contract 
between spouses regarding the resource management system in the second stage, and show the 
conditions under which it is optimal for one spouse to hide a monetary transfer from the other.  
The first model corresponds to the case where each spouse handles his or her own resources 
independently and makes individual contributions towards the household public good. The second 
model corresponds to a household under a housekeeping allowance system, where there is gender 
specialization.  Both  models  have  multiple  equilibria:  when  both  spouses  make  strictly  positive 
contributions towards the household public good in the first model, or when the husband provides a 
strictly positive housekeeping allowance to his wife in the second, there exist incentives to hide 
income because the husband‘s contribution is decreasing in his wife‘s resources. There are also 
corner solutions that imply free-riding, where no incentives for hiding exist because one spouse‘s 
allocations are unaffected by the other. The third model considers a collective household where 
spouses  bargain  over  the  way  the  joint  pool  of  resources  is  allocated.  An  illustrative  example 
assuming Cobb-Douglas utility is also provided.  
The  models‘  results  indicate  that  when  one  spouse  receives  a  monetary  transfer  that  is 
unobservable to her spouse, in equilibrium, income hiding can occur. The models further predict 4 
 
that income hiding is more likely to occur in a household with a housekeeping allowance contract 
than in independent management household. In joint management households, however, a spouse 
may hide in equilibrium if the change in bargaining power associated with revealing the transfer is 
not significant enough to compensate for the loss in discretionary expenditure.   
Income hiding between spouses has relevant policy implications on the design of poverty 
alleviation programs. A thorough investigation of the household resource management arrangement 
is necessary prior to the design and implementation of programs because that will determine the 
propensity of households to hide resources that are unobserved and to allocate those resources away 
from  household  public  goods.  Further,  governments  rely  on  cash  transfers  as  instruments  for 
redistribution  of  wealth  to  poor  households;  however  information  asymmetries  regarding  the 
amount of these transfers or even other resources, could interfere with achieving goals such as 
improving child human capital investments.  
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 a review of household resource control 
structures is presented; in Section 3 I describe the general characteristics of the models. In Sections 4 
through 6 the models are developed, focusing on the conditions that must be met for income hiding 
to be an equilibrium outcome. In Section 7, I present some concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Household Resource Control Structures 
 
The sociology literature has focused on developing a typology of household allocation systems (Pahl 
(1983)) that vary on whether spouses have separate or joint spheres of responsibility for managing 
household  money,  whereas  economics  focuses  on  modeling  the  decision-making  process.  Pahl 
identifies four allocation systems, three of which involve separate spheres, the whole wage system, 
the  housekeeping allowance  system  and  the  independent  management  system,  while  the  shared 5 
 
system involves joint spheres of responsibility (Pahl (1983)). These systems consist of an implicit or 
explicit contract of how the resources are managed within the household, and vary depending upon 
who has access or control over resources.  
The  whole-wage  system  can  be  divided  into  female  and  male  managed.  This  system 
characterizes low income households, with labor specialization among spouses. In the male whole wage 
system, the husband manages all of the resources, such that the wife may not have any resources for 
personal spending unless she has her own earnings. In actuality, this system is mostly observed in 
households where the wife is not employed. This case corresponds to the unitary model of the 
household,  where  there  is  a  person  that  has  all  the  bargaining  power  and  thus  makes  all  the 
decisions. In the female whole wage system, husbands hand all of their income minus the proportion they 
will use for personal spending to their wives and the wife is in charge of all the budgeting of the 
household thereafter (see Land (1969); Wilson (1987); Pahl (1983) in Pahl (1994)). In the housekeeping 
allowance system, the husband hands a fixed pre-contracted sum to his wife for household spending 
and he keeps the rest of his income for his own spending. This system is associated to middle class 
couples where the husband is the only earner (see Oakley (1974); Edwards (1981); Gray (1979); Pahl 
(1983) in Pahl (1994)). Both of these systems resemble the separate spheres model (Lundberg and 
Pollak  (1993),  where  there  is  gender  specialization.  Further,  these  systems  generate  different 
incentives  for  income  withholding.  Gray  (1979)  found  that,  in  households  where  the  husband 
handed over his entire wage to his wife, he was less likely to earn money from overtime work 
relative to husbands who gave their wives a fixed housekeeping allowance. In the latter case extra 
earnings were retained by the husband, thus generating a greater incentive for him to do overtime 
(Gray, (1979) in Pahl, (1983)). 
In the independent management system, each spouse handles her resources separately, and thus 
neither has access to all of the household money. This system resembles the voluntary contributions 6 
 
model,  in  the  sense  that  each  spouse  decides  on  the  optimal  allocation  of  her  own  resources 
independently of her spouse. It has been found in households with high income levels where both 
spouses are earners and have similar levels of education (Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2006); 
Chen and Wooley (2001)). Finally, in the pooling system both partners have access to all or nearly all of 
the household resources and both are thought to be responsible for management and expenditure 
from the common pool. This system is characteristic of middle income couples where both spouses 
work.  This  is  the  case  of  a  collective  household,  where  the  partners  bargain  over  the  way  the 
common pool is allocated.  
Cultural and socio-economic characteristics determine the resource allocation management 
system  within  the  household,  which  in  turn  establishes  the  distribution  of  responsibilities  and 
control  over  resources.  In  what  follows,  I  will  argue  that  the  incentives  to  exploit information 
asymmetries regarding income and expenditure  depend on the  implicit agreement regarding the 
resource allocation system within the household and the enforceability of these contracts. Most of 
the literature on intra-household bargaining under asymmetric information has focused on the study 
of moral hazard as a result of migration (Chen, (2009); De Laat, (2008)). However, information 
asymmetries  may  be  exploited  among  household  members  living  under  the  same  roof  (Ashraf, 
(2009); Udry, (1996); Vogler and Pahl, (1994)).  
Ashraf (2009) examines the effect of the information environment on savings decisions in 
the Philippines among married couples, and finds that given the opportunity, husbands will withhold 
money from their wives and use it for their private consumption. Her experimental results indicate 
in the Philippines, where a form of female whole wage allocation system prevails, husbands hand all of 
their income to their wives, who in turn give them a proportion of the resources back for their own 
personal  spending and keep the  rest for household expenditures. Thus,  the  wife  has dictatorial 
power in deciding what to do with the joint pool. In this paper it is argued that the choice whether 7 
 
to pool an unobservable monetary transfer (or deposit them in the joint account) depends on the 
type of contracting system and the change in the spouses‘ bargaining power that results from the 
presence of additional resources. The models described in what follows provides a framework to 
analyze the decision to hide resources based upon the share each spouse gets back, which depends 
on their bargaining power and the contract regarding control over resources, among other factors. 
 
 
3.  General Description of the Family Decision Making Model 
 
In the model there are two family members, f and m. The household resource allocation decision is 
made in two stages. In the first stage household member f receives a monetary transfer (T) that is 
not perfectly observable to household member m. The idea of the model is to mimic monetary 
transfers that are independent of household members‘ labor market decisions, such as gifts, bonuses, 
or government transfers. Household member f has to decide whether to reveal that she received a 
transfer  or  to  keep  it  for  private  consumption.  For  now  T  is  assumed  to  be  observable  with 
probability  zero  and  it  is  also  assumed  that  m cannot  observe  f’s  private  consumption  choices, 
though m can perfectly infer the increase in income through the public good allocation. In the 
second stage, each household member makes his consumption choices conditional on the amount 
of the  transfer  member  f  revealed.  The family decision-making process is solved by backwards 
induction. First, the consumption choices conditional on the amount of the transfer that becomes 
common knowledge are described, and then the circumstances under which it is optimal for f to hide 
the transfer are determined. 
  Both family members have preferences over consumption of one private (or personal) good, 
denoted xi, and one household public good, Q. I assume that both family members face the same 
price for private goods which is normalized to 1 (one can think about the private good as being 8 
 
money for any other type of private consumption), and p is the price for the public good (Q). If both 
household members pool their incomes the joint budget constraint is: 
?? + ?? + ?? = 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ?              (1) 
If each member decides to allocate the income at her disposal separately, (Yi) between private and 
household public goods, their individual budget constraint is: 
?? + ??? = 𝑌 ? + ??   for i = f,m            (2) 
Preferences over own consumption are represented by an egotistic utility function, Ui. Utility 
depends on the aggregate level of consumption of household public goods (? = ?? + ??) and 
private goods (x). I assume that utility is separable in x and Q: 
?? = ? ?,??  = ? ??  + ? ?     for i = f,m        (3) 
The functions ? ∙  and ? ∙  satisfy the standard assumptions that ?′ > 0, ?′ > 0, ?′′ < 0, ?′′ < 0, 
and ?′(0) = ∞. ?′(0) = ∞, implying x and Q are normal goods. In (3) I assume that the family 
members have the same functional form for simplicity, though in the examples provided I allow the 
different members to have different preferences over their private goods by specifying different 
preference parameters for each spouse. The characterization of goods as public or private depends 
on the nature of the good. The household public goods are assumed to be non-rival in utility, so 
they are of the Samuelson type. For instance, a clean house provides utility to both members of the 
household, while food provides utility only to the person that consumed it.  
  In  what  follows  I  develop  three  models  that  differ  on  the  contract  between  spouses 
regarding the resource allocation mechanism, and show the conditions under which it is optimal for 
one spouse to hide a monetary transfer from the other. The first model corresponds to the case 
where  each  spouse  handles  his  or  her  own  resources  independently  and  makes  individual 
contributions towards the household public good. The second model corresponds to a household 
under a housekeeping allowance system, which resembles the Lundberg and Pollak (1993) separate 9 
 
spheres  case.  Both  models  have  multiple  equilibria:  when  both  spouses  make  strictly  positive 
contributions towards the household public good in the first model, or when the husband provides a 
strictly positive housekeeping allowance to his wife in the second, there exist incentives to hide 
income because the husband‘s contribution is decreasing in his wife‘s resources. There are also 
corner solutions that imply free-riding, where no incentives for hiding exist because one spouse‘s 
allocations are unaffected by the other. The third model considers a collective household where 
spouses bargain over the way the joint pool of resources is allocated. For each model, an illustrative 
example assuming Cobb-Douglas utility is provided. 
 
 
4.  Independent Resource Management Household 
 
This section considers the case where spouses have an independent resource management system, 
which implies that no spouse has direct access to all household‘s resources. I model this case using a 
voluntary contributions game. In this model each spouse decides separately how to allocate her 
resources between the household good and private consumption, taking the other‘s contribution as 
given. I start by solving the game before f receives the monetary transfer (T). The optimization 
problem of spouse i is to maximize the objective function (3) subject to her own budget constraint 
(2)  (with  T=0)  and  taking  j’s  household  good  purchases,  Qi,  as  given.  Solving  (2)  for  xi  and 
substituting into (3) the optimization problem can be re-expressed as: 
max??≥0 ?? = ? 𝑌 ? − ???  + ? ?? + ??   for i,j = f,m      (4) 
A non-negativity constraint is imposed on Qi because a corner solution is possible. The Kuhn-
Tucker first-order conditions for this problem are: 
𝜕??
𝜕??





≤ 0  
?? ≥ 0  
Because the problem is symmetric, solving the problem for each spouse yields the following reaction 
functions: 
−? ?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  + ?′ ?? + ??  ≤ 0        (5) 
−? ?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  + ?′ ?? + ??  ≤ 0       (6) 
Solving  the  system  of  reaction  functions  that  result  from  the  Kuhn-Tucker  conditions 
simultaneously yields the Nash equilibrium. Note that there are corner solutions, as well as interior 
solutions. Proposition 1 follows Wooley and Chen (2001) results to specify the conditions that must 
be met for an interior solution to exist. 
 
Proposition 1: Given Ym, there exists a 𝑌 ?   in the interval  0,𝑌 ?  such that the Nash equilibrium is a corner 
solution with ?? = 0 if 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌 ?   ; given Yf, there exists a 𝑌 ?      in the interval  0,𝑌 ?  such that the Nash equilibrium 
is a corner solution with ?? = 0 if 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌 ?     ; and an interior solution exists with ??,?? > 0 when 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?   and 
𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     . 
The properties of the corner solution equilibria are different from the properties of the interior 
equilibrium. In the corner solutions free-riding is observed, thus there is under-provision of the 
household public good, while the interior solution is the voluntary contributions equilibrium. These 
properties are demonstrated in Proposition 2, focusing on the implications for changes in f‘s income.  
 
   11 
 
4.1  Corner Equilibria: 
 
Following Proposition 1, if 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?        ∈  0,𝑌?  or 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌?  it is optimal for one of the 
household  members  to  free  ride
1.  The conditions for free -riding  depend  on  how  one  spouse‘s 
income compares his or her spouse‘s, so unless their incomes are relatively close the public good will 
be underprovided, even within the context of the independent management contract. Proposition 2 
states the properties of the equilibrium with respect to changes in  f’s income and provides the 
foundations as to why in a free-riding equilibrium there are no incentives to hide a monetary transfer 
from m. 
 
Proposition 2: In a free-riding equilibrium, 
Case (i): If 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?        ∈  0,𝑌?  thus ?? = 0, 
























= 0.  
Case (ii): If 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌?  thus ?? = 0, 
























= 0.  
 
If spouse m is the sole provider of the public good, an increase in Yf will only impact f‘s private 
consumption as long as 𝑌 ? + ∆𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌 ?  . If spouse f is the sole provider of the household public good, 
                                                           
1 Browning, et al. (2006) show that for multiple public goods, at most both household members will contribute to one, 
and for the rest they will specialize in the provision based upon relative preferences towards the public goods. They 
show that when household members specialize, which is equivalent to the separate spheres case, these outcomes can be 
used as the non-cooperative threat points to the bargaining game. This is possible because unless both players make 
strictly positive contributions to all public goods, there is free-riding and so outcomes are inefficient, thus there can be 
gains from bargaining. 12 
 
an increase in Yf doesn‘t impact m’s private or public good consumption as long as 𝑌 ? + ∆𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌 ?     . 
In either case, changes in Yf have no impact on m’s allocations. Now consider the case when f 
receives a transfer (T) that is observable to household member m with probability zero. Spouse f 
then has to decide whether to allocate the monetary transfer (T) between private and household 
good consumption, thus directly or indirectly informing m about the increase in her resources, or to 
hide it and spend it all on private consumption. If they are at a corner solution and the transfer does 
not increase f‘s income enough to move to an interior solution, then there is no incentive to hide the 
transfer because a change in Yf only impacts f’s choices. However, the transfer can be such that 
𝑌 ? + ∆𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?    in  which case  the  free-riding  equilibrium for Case  (i) would  turn into an interior 
equilibrium. 
 
4.2  Interior Equilibrium 
 
The case in which both spouses make positive contributions to the household public good, from 
now on the interior equilibrium, is efficient within the context of the independent management 
contract. It is known that if public goods are provided via voluntary contributions, the solution is 
inefficient relative to what a social planer could achieve or even compared to a collective household. 
However, within the context of an independent management agreement, the interior solution is the 
best they can do. This equilibrium is non-cooperative in the sense that no binding agreements are 
made, but achieves Pareto efficiency in a self enforcing way, as it is each spouse‘s best response to 
make strictly positive contributions if the conditions 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?   and 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?      are met. This conditions 
imply that spouses income‘s are similar, which aligns with evidence indicating that an independent 
management  system  is  usually  found  among  upper-middle  class  couples,  with  similar  levels  of 13 
 
education, where both spouses work (Vogley and Pahl, (1994)). Proposition 3 states the properties 
of the interior equilibrium. 
 




























When  both  spouses  are  making  positive  contributions  (i.e.  they  are  at an  interior  solution),  an 
increase in Yf increases both f and m’s private consumption, and f’s contribution to the public good, 
but m’s contribution decreases. This is the source of the incentives to hide income: as f’s resources 
increase, m reduces his contribution to the household good. Thus f, can be made better off by hiding 
because it prevents m from reducing his contribution towards the public good, such that she can 
maintain the same household good consumption, in addition to the possibility of increasing her 
private consumption as well.  
Now  consider  the  case  when  f  receives  a  transfer  (T)  that  is  observable  to  household 
member m with probability zero. Spouse f then has to decide whether to reveal the transfer, and 
allocate it between private and household good consumption, or to hide it and spend it all on private 
consumption.  If  they  are  at  an  interior  equilibrium,  an  increase  in  f‘s  resources  decreases  m’s 
contribution towards the public good and so if the conditions described in Proposition 4 are met, in 
equilibrium f will hide the transfer from m. 
 
Proposition 4: Given Yf, Ym, when 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?   and 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     , there exists a threshold level of transfer (?  ) such 
that for any ? < ?   the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is to hide the transfer. 14 
 
 
Proposition 4 stems from the comparison of the change in utility derived by f per unit of transfer, 
such that f will hide the transfer in equilibrium if the change in utility for every unit of T of revealing 
the transfer is less than the change in utility of not revealing the transfer and allocating it to private 
consumption. The decision to hide, however, depends on the size of the transfer: small transfers are 
likely to be hidden, whereas large transfers are likely to be revealed. The intuition for this result is 
that once a large enough transfer is received, on the margin, the reduction in the contribution of the 
spouse towards the public good becomes irrelevant. The following section provides a more intuitive 
result assuming preferences are of the Cobb-Douglas type. 
 
4.3  Illustrative Example 
 
An example can provide further intuition on the incentives to hide income. Consider the case of 
Cobb-Douglas preferences such that: 
?? = ? ?,??  = 𝗼???? ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? ?             (7) 
?? = ? ?,??  = 𝗼???? ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? ?     
Where 𝗼? and 𝗼? are between 0 and 1. Each member then maximizes (7) subject to her own budget 
constraint  (2),  where  Tm=0  such  that  only  spouse  f  receives  a  transfer.  From  the  first-order 
conditions, the reaction functions take the following form: 
?? ??  =  
 1−𝗼? 𝑌?−𝗼????
?    for i=f, m=j          (8) 
Solving the system yields the Nash equilibrium private contributions to the household public good: 
 
??
??∗ =  
 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+?  −𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,  ??
??∗ =  
 1−𝗼? 𝑌? −𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,   (9) 
 15 
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(i)  Corner Equilibria 
 
Case  (i):  If  𝑌 ? ∈  0,
𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+? 
 1−𝗼?     then  ??
??∗ = 0,  ??
??∗ = 𝑌 ?,  ??
??∗ = 𝗼?𝑌 ?,  ??
??∗ =
 1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ?.  
Case (ii): If 𝑌 ? + ? ∈  0,
𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?   , i.e. if the transfer is such that an interior solution continues to 
be unfeasible, then ??
??∗ = 0, ??
??∗ = 𝑌 ?, ??
??∗ = 𝗼?𝑌 ?, ??
??∗ =  1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ?.  
If the transfer is such that  1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + ?  < 𝗼? 1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? then m’s allocations do 
not change as f’s resources change in either case, thus there are no incentives to hide the transfer. 
 
(ii)  Interior Equilibrium 
Once f receives the transfer and if 𝑌 ? ∈  
𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?  ,∞  and 𝑌 ? + ? ∈  
𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?  ,∞  then the 
optimal demands are given by: 
??
??∗ =  
 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+?  −𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,  ??
??∗ =  
𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼?    
                           (10) 
??
??∗ =  
 1−𝗼? 𝑌? −𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,  ??
??∗ =  
𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼?    
 
If f hides the transfer however, the demands are: 
??
??𝐻∗ =  
 1−𝗼?  𝑌?  −𝗼? 1−𝗼? 𝑌?
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,  ??
??𝐻∗ =  
𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼?    + ? 
                           (10a) 
??
??𝐻∗ =  
 1−𝗼? 𝑌? −𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼? ?  ,  ??
??𝐻∗ =  
𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?𝗼?    17 
 
 



















𝗼? 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+𝑌? + 1−𝗼?𝗼? ? =  𝜕??
𝜕?  
??
   (11) 
Simplifying yields the following condition, 
𝗼?𝗼?
 1−𝗼?𝗼?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  > ?              (12) 
Thus, if there exists a transfer smaller than the proportion 
𝗼?𝗼?
 1−𝗼?𝗼?  < 1 of joint household income, 
spouse f is better off hiding the transfer and allocating it to private consumption. Note that the 
transfer threshold level depends on relative preferences for private and public consumption between 
household members. In particular, the transfer threshold level increases as either  f’s and/or m’s 
preference  for  private  consumption  increase  relative  to  household  good  consumption.  This  is 
particularly interesting, because the decision to hide does not only depend on f’s relative preferences 
between private and public good consumption. If m prefers private consumption more, he would be 
more  likely  to  reduce  his  contribution  towards  the  public  good  as  f’s  resources  increase,  also 
strengthening the incentives to hide. 
 
 
5.  Housekeeping Allowance Resource Management Model 
 
In this section, the case where spouses adopt a housekeeping allowance system is considered, which 
corresponds to the case when there is gender specialization, such that the husband is in charge of 
providing money to the household, while the wife specializes in the provision of the public good. I 
model this case using a slightly simpler version of the Lundberg and Pollak (1993) separate spheres 
model, where the husband chooses the housekeeping allowance he gives his wife (s), and the wife 18 
 
chooses the household good allocation (Q)
2. As in the independent management model, spouses do 
not commit to any binding agreements. The game has 3 stages: in the first stage, spouse f receives a 
monetary transfer (T) that is unobservable to spouse m and chooses whether to reveal the transfer or 
not; in the second stage, spouse m chooses the housekeeping allowance (s) he will give spouse f; and 
in stage three, spouse f decides the public good provision conditional of both T and s. The model is 
solved by backwards induction. 
  In particular, spouse f solves the following optimization problem, 
max?≥0; ??≥0 ?? =? ?  + ? ??      ?.?.   ?? ≤ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??       (13)  
Substituting in the budget constraint, the Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition for Q is 
?′ ?  − ??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  ≤ 0                (14) 
Conducting comparative statics on the above condition yields, 
𝜕?
𝜕? =
??′′  𝑌?+?−?? 
?′′  ? +?2?′′ 𝑌?+?−??  > 0                (15) 
So, the housekeeping allowance is the husband‘s way to increase his household good consumption. 
Taking spouse f’s first-order condition as given, spouse m solves:
3 
max?≥0; ??≥0;?≥0 ?? =? ?  + ? ??   
?.?.      ?? ≤ 𝑌 ? − ?;  ?′ ?  − ??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  ≤ 0       (16)  
The Lagrangian is: 
ℒ = ? ?  + ? 𝑌 ? − ?  + ? ??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  − ?′ ?   
                                                           
2 It would be more realistic to let spouses to commit to a binding allowance (t) and then allow the husband to choose the 
supplementary allowance (s) as in Lundberg and Pollak (1993), because it is unlikely that the husband in this household 
resource management arrangement would not give any money to his wife. However, the results do not differ and it 
simplifies the proofs. One way to reconcile this idea is to think about the problem in terms of spouses‘ disposable 
income, net of the binding allowance (t). 
3 This is equivalent to setting the optimization problem in the following way: 
max?≥0; ??≥0;?≥0 ?? =? ? ?   + ? ??  ?.?.      ?? ≤ 𝑌 ? − ?;  ? ?  ≥ 0 




which yields the following Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions, 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕? = ?′ ?  − ??2?′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  − ??′′ ?  ≤ 0          (17) 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕? = −?′ 𝑌 ? − ?  + ???′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  ≤ 0         (18)  
𝜕ℒ
𝜕? = ??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  − ?′ ?  = 0           (19)  
? 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕?  = 0, ? 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕?  = 0; ? 
𝜕ℒ
𝜕?  = 0; ? ≥ 0; ? ≥ 0 
 
Solving  the  system  of  first-order  conditions  simultaneously  yields  the  Subgame  Perfect  Nash 
equilibrium. Note that there is a corner solution where the housekeeping allowance can be non-
positive, as well as interior solutions. Note also that the household public good provision will never 
be equal to zero. Proposition 5 specifies the conditions that must be met for an interior solution to 
exist. 
 
Proposition  5:  Given  Yf,  there  exists  a  𝑌 ?       in  the  interval   0,𝑌 ?   such  that  the  Subgame  Perfect  Nash 
equilibrium is a corner solution with ? = 0 and ? > 0 if 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌 ?     .  
As in the independent management model, the properties of the corner solution equilibrium are 
different from the properties of the interior equilibrium. The idea is that whether the housekeeping 
allowance  occurs  depends  on  how  m’s  income  compares  to  f’s  income.  These  properties  are 
demonstrated in Proposition 6 and 7, focusing on the implications for changes in f‘s income.  
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5.1  Corner Equilibrium: 
 
Following  Proposition  5,  if  𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌? ,  it  is  optimal  for  m  to  give  a  non-positive 
housekeeping allowance to f. As shown by Lundberg and Pollak (1993), this yields an inefficient 
outcome that could be improved upon by bargaining. Proposition 6 states the properties of the 
equilibrium with respect to changes in f’s income and provides the foundations as to why in corner 
equilibrium there are no incentives to hide a monetary transfer from m. 
 
Proposition 6: In a corner solution, 
If 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌?  thus ? = 0, 
























= 0.  
 
If spouse m is not making a positive housekeeping allowance to f, changes in Yf have no impact on 
m’s allocations. Now consider the case when f receives a transfer (T) that is observable to household 
member m with probability zero. Spouse f then has to decide whether to allocate the monetary 
transfer (T) between private and household good consumption, thus directly or indirectly informing 
m about the increase in her resources, or to hide it and spend it all on private consumption. If the 
distribution of income is such that 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌? , then there is no incentive to hide the transfer 
because a change in Yf only impacts f’s allocations.  
 
   21 
 
5.2  Housekeeping Allowance Equilibrium 
 
The case in which m gives a housekeeping allowance to his wife is Pareto efficient within the context 
of a management system in which spouses do not have access to all of the household resources, and 
is self-enforcing because no binding agreements are made. In this case, as long as 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     , it is m‘s 
best  response  to  give  a  strictly  positive  housekeeping  allowance  to  f  in  order  to  increase  his 
household good consumption. Proposition 7 states the properties of the housekeeping allowance 
equilibrium. 
 















< 0.  
 
When m gives a strictly positive housekeeping allowance to his wife, an increase in Yf increases both f 
and m’s private consumption and f’s contribution to the public good, though it is likely to decrease 
m’s supplementary transfer. This is the source of the incentive to hide income. If f reveals that her 
resources have increased, in order to increase her public good consumption, she will first have to 
compensate the reduction in spouse m’s housekeeping allowance, and then supplement her private 
and  household  good  consumption.  If  she  hides  however,  she  can  keep  her  household  good 
consumption  constant  by  preventing  m  from  reducing  his  allowance,  and  increase  her  private 
consumption in the amount of the additional resources.  
Now consider the case when f receives a transfer (T) and has to decide whether to allocate T 
between  private  and  household  good  consumption,  or  to  hide  it  and  spend  it  all  on  private 
consumption. If the conditions described in Proposition 8 are met, f will hide the transfer from m. 
 22 
 
Proposition 8: Given Yf, Ym when 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     , there exists a threshold level of transfer (?  ) such that for any 
? < ?   the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is to hide the transfer.  
 
As before, if the change in utility per unit change in the transfer is higher when f hides the transfer 
compared  to  when  she  reveals  it,  then  income-hiding  is  an  equilibrium.  The  decision  to  hide 
depends not only on the relative change in marginal utility of private and public consumption for 
both household members, but on the size of the transfer, such that small transfers will be hidden. So 
far,  I  have  shown  that  when  spouses  have  independent  accounts  or  when  there  is  gender 
specialization,  there  is  a  threshold  level  of  transfer  such  that  income  hiding  is  an  equilibrium. 
However, without assuming a specific functional form, I cannot determine if hiding is more equally 
likely in both management systems. The Cobb-Douglas example provides further intuition on the 
decision to hide money, and indicates that, ceteris paribus, a household that adopts a housekeeping 
allowance system is more likely to hide than a household with independent accounts. 
 
5.3  Illustrative Example: 
 
Consider preferences are of the form specified in (7), then spouse f solves: 
max?≥0; ??≥0 ?? =𝗼???? ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? ?      ?.?.   ?? ≤ 𝑌 ? + ? + ? − ??   (20) 
which yields the following first order condition: 
 1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + ? + ?  ≤ ??                 (21) 
Taking spouse f’s first order condition (38) as given, spouse m solves 
max?≥0; ??≥0 ?? =𝗼???? ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? 
 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+?+? 
?   ?.?.   ?? ≤ 𝑌 ? − ? − ?  (22) 
The Kuhn-Tucker first-order condition for s yields the following, 
 1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? − 𝗼?𝑌 ? − ? ≤ ?               (23) 23 
 
 
(i)  Corner Equilibrium 
From  condition  (23)  we  can  see  that  if   1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝗼?𝑌 ? + ?  then  s=0,  and  thus  ? =
 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+? 
? , ?? = 𝗼? 𝑌 ? + ? , ?? = 𝑌 ? − ?. Note that a monetary transfer that increases Yf, has 
no impact on the housekeeping allowance, and thus no impact on m’s allocations, so there are no 
incentives for f to hide if this is the relevant equilibrium. 
 
(ii)  Housekeeping Allowance Equilibrium 
Following  from  condition  (23),  if   1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? > 𝗼?𝑌 ? + ?  then  ? =  1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? − 𝗼?𝑌 ? − ?, 
?? = 𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? , ? =
 1−𝗼?  1−𝗼? 
?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? , ?? = 𝗼? 1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? .    
It  is  clear  that  if  spouse  f  receives  a  monetary  transfer  T,  m’s  supplementary  transfer 
decreases, so f is faced with a trade-off that will determine her decision to reveal. If she reveals T the 
equilibrium allocations are: 
? =  1 − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? − 𝗼? 𝑌 ? + ?  − ?,    ?? = 𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ? , 
 ? =
 1−𝗼?  1−𝗼? 
?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ? ,     ?? = 𝗼? 1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ? .  
Thus,  the  increase  in  f’s  resources  increases  public  good  consumption  and  private  expenditure 
relative to the allocations before the transfer, though the later not as much as if she hides T and 
allocates it all to private consumption while maintaining m’s housekeeping allowance. In particular, if 
f  hides  the  transfer,  Q  and  s  remain  at  the  levels  observed  before  the  transfer,  but  f’s  private 
consumption increases in the amount of the transfer, such that ?? = 𝗼? 1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  + ?. 
The decision to reveal is given by comparing the change in utility per unit of T given spouse f 24 
 


















 1−𝗼?  𝑌?+𝑌? +? =  𝜕??
𝜕?  
??
   (24) 
Re-arranging  yields   1 − 𝗼?  𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  + ? < 𝑌 ? + ? + 𝑌 ?  and  the  condition  simplifies  to 
0 < 𝗼? which unless spouse m has no preference for private consumption (𝗼? = 0) always holds, 
therefore implying that it is always the case that f hides T. Therefore, hiding is more likely to occur in 




6.  Collective Bargaining Model 
 
In this section, I describe the equilibrium allocations that result when spouses bargain over public 
and private consumption collectively, which corresponds to the case where spouses adopt a joint 
resource management system. In this type of household, both spouses have access to all of the 
household resources and jointly decide how to allocate them. I model this case using an augmented 
version of the Browning and Chiappori (1998) collective bargaining model, which is more general 
relative to other bargaining models that assume specific threat points and functional forms. In this 
version of the collective household model, everything but the monetary transfer received by f is 
common knowledge, such that the decision to hide can be thought of as the step prior to choosing 
to pool income every time new resources are available to each household member.  
The information asymmetry is introduced by allowing the monetary transfer (T) received by 
spouse f to be observable with probability zero. In deciding to reveal or hide the transfer, f faces a 
trade-off between increasing her own discretionary spending and increasing her bargaining power.  25 
 
If she hides the transfer, f may spend the entire amount without influence from her spouse. But, 
public goods are observable by both spouses.  Therefore, if the wife is to successfully hide her 
additional  income,  she  can  spend  it  only  on  private  consumption,  which  is  unobservable.  
Conversely, if she reveals the transfer, the wife can increase her influence over intra-household 
allocation decisions, but her income will effectively be taxed via the bargaining process. I allow 
household members to have different preferences, bargain over all allocations, and assume they can 
negotiate binding agreements with zero transaction costs. 
  The collective bargaining equilibrium is solved in two stages. In the first stage, f receives a 
monetary transfer T and decides whether or not to reveal it. Given that this is a cooperative setting, 
revelation in this case is equivalent to pooling. In the second stage, f and m bargain over the public 
good  allocation  and  the  share  of  the  remaining  resources  that  each  will  get  for  their  private 
consumption. These resources are divided according to a sharing rule that depends on each spouse‘s 
bargaining power. The game is solved by backwards induction, so first I find the optimal public 
good allocation and private expenditure shares conditional on the amount of the transfer that is 
revealed, and then derive the conditions that must be met for f to reveal the transfer.  
In the second stage, the objective function of the collective household is the bargaining 
power weighted sum of each member‘s utility: 
? =? ? ??  + ? ?   +  1 − ?  ? ??  + ? ?         (25) 
Where  is the relative bargaining power of spouse f and (1-) is the bargaining power of spouse m. 
This is the weight given to each spouse‘s utility in the household welfare function when bargaining, 
and it is partially determined by each spouse‘s outside options (Ua, Ub), as well as by resources 
originally brought into the marriage, and distribution factors such as culture and law (z). In this 
model I will not assume any threat point in particular because the goal is to model the decision to 
hide income by a spouse in a joint management system. Therefore, I use the bargaining weight as a 26 
 
generic way to incorporate the existence of a threat point, such that ? = ? 𝑌 ?,𝑌 ?,𝑧,? . Consistent 
with  both  non-cooperative  equilibria  within  marriage  and  divorce  threat  points,  I  assume  the 
transfer increases f’s bargaining power (?). However, I do not specify a functional form in order to 
avoid making assumptions about the relative weights resources would have over other factors that 
influence bargaining power but that do not vary when the quantity of resources increases.  
The collective household‘s problem is to maximize (25) subject to the aggregate budget 
constraint (1). Given that households with joint resource management systems have already found a 
way to cooperate and negotiate binding contracts, I solve the collective model assuming that the 
participation constraints do not bind, i.e. assuming that both spouses are better off cooperating than 
under the threat points. This is not a strong assumption given that spouses are bargaining over all 
allocations, such that the public good provision will be efficient (at least when all information is 
revealed). 
max?,??≥0
                     ? ? ??  + ? ?  
        + 1 − ?  ? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ? − ?? − ??  + ? ?  
      (26) 
 
where 𝑌 = 𝑌? + 𝑌?. For now assyme T=0. The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions of the problem 
in (26) are: 
 
∂C








∂Q  =0; xf  
∂C
∂xf
  = 0; ?,?? ≥ 0            (27) 
Solving this system yields the demand for the household public good and the demand for resources 
for private consumption. The Kuhn Tucker conditions imply that in this case, there are no corner 27 
 
solutions.  The  optimal  demands  respond  to  changes  in  aggregate  income  (i.e.  income  pooling 
feature) and to changes in individual income through bargaining power. Proposition 9 states the 
comparative statics. 
 
Proposition 9: An increase in aggregate income (Y) increases public and private consumption for both household 
members, whereas an increase in f’s bargaining power () increases her private consumption, decreases m’s private 
consumption, and can either increase or decrease public good consumption.  
 
In the first stage, f must decide whether to reveal the transfer or to hide if from m, thus f compares 
for each case the change in utility per unit of T. Proposition 9 implies that if f receives a monetary 
transfer (T) she faces the following trade-off: if she hides the transfer, she can get more private 
expenditure relative to the case where she reveals and pools all of her resources. If she reveals, f can 
increase her household good consumption, but both her private and public good consumption will 
not increase as much as she would like because they are effectively taxed by bargaining power.  
 
Proposition 10: Given Yf, Ym and T, there exists a strictly positive threshold change in bargaining power ∆?       such 
that for any 
𝜕?
𝜕? < ∆?       income-hiding is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium iff:  
?2? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    ?′ ??      − ??′ ??     +  1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    ?′ ??      − ?′ ??     + ??′ ??     ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    > 0  (28) 
 
Corollary 1: Given Yf, Ym and T, ∆?       is decreasing in the initial level of bargaining power of spouse f, ., such that 




Proposition 10 implies that the decision to hide money when bargaining depends not only on the 
change in bargaining power but on the initial level of bargaining power as well. Corollary 1 implies 
that if f has low bargaining power, the threshold level of bargaining power below which she will hide 
the transfer from m is higher, whereas as f’s bargaining power approaches 1 she will not withhold any 
money. This result is intuitive because if f’s bargaining power is low, she is less likely to influence 
household allocations towards her preferences and thus her private consumption is ―taxed‖ more 
severely.  
 
6.1  Illustrative Example 
 
In the first stage, the optimization problem of the collective household is thus to maximize the 
bargaining power weighted sum of individual utility functions in (7) subject to the household (or 
aggregate) budget constraint (1) conditional on .  
 
max?,??≥0
                           
? 𝗼???? ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? ?   +  1 − ?  𝗼???? 𝑌 − ?? − ??  +  1 − 𝗼? ??? ?    (29) 
 
Recall that 𝑌 = 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ?. The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions are: 
∂C




=?𝗼? 𝑌 − ??  −  ?𝗼? +  1 − ? 𝗼? ?? ≤ 0  
 
Solving the system yields the optimal demands if the transfer is revealed, where ?   is the new level of 
bargaining power given T, ?   = ?(? > 0) and ? = ?(? = 0). 
?
?∗ =  ?   1 − 𝗼?  +  1 − ?    1 − 𝗼?   
𝑌?+𝑌?+?




?∗ = ?  𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ?  ;     ??
?∗ =  1 − ?   𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ? + ?  
 
If f hides the transfer however,  
?
?𝐻∗ =  ? 1 − 𝗼?  +  1 − ?  1 − 𝗼?   
𝑌?+𝑌?
?               (31.a) 
 
??
?𝐻∗ = ?𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  + ? ;     ??
?𝐻∗ =  1 − ? 𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  
























?   𝗼?−𝗼? + 1−𝗼? 𝗼?





?𝗼? 𝑌?+𝑌? +? =  𝜕??
𝜕?  
??
                 (32) 




?   ?   1 − 𝗼?  +  1 − ?    1 − 𝗼?  
?   𝗼?−𝗼?  +  1 − 𝗼? 𝗼?
  
𝗼?
?𝗼? 𝑌 ? + 𝑌 ?  + ?
−
1
𝑌 ? + ? + 𝑌 ?
  
Note  that 
𝗼?




𝗼? 1−?  𝑌?+𝑌?  − 1−𝗼? ?
 ?𝗼? 𝑌?+𝑌? +?  𝑌?+?+𝑌?   > 0 ??? 
𝗼? 1−?  𝑌?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?  > ?  and 
?   ?   1−𝗼? + 1−?    1−𝗼?  
?   𝗼?−𝗼? + 1−𝗼? 𝗼?
> 0 so, if the transfer is small enough relative to aggregate household income, 
f has an incentive to hide money from m because the change in bargaining power is not enough to 
compensate for the loss in private consumption.  
  Finally,  if  we  compare  the  three  threshold  levels  of  transfer  such  that  hiding  is  the 
equilibrium for the three different management systems considered in this paper, we can see that: 
𝗼?𝗼? 𝑌?+𝑌?  
 1−𝗼?𝗼?  >
𝗼? 1−?  𝑌?+𝑌? 
 1−𝗼?  > ?              (33) 
Recall that hiding always occurs in a housekeeping management system, so hiding is more likely to 
occur in this case, relative to both, an independent and a joint management household. Further, it is 30 
 
not  clear  whether  hiding  is  more  likely  to  occur  under  an  independent  management  contract, 
compared  to  a  pooling  household.  If  we  let  𝗼? = 1−?  then  it  is  clear  that  an  independent 
management contract would be more prone to hiding. If 𝗼? < 1−? then (33) holds as well. The 
only case where it is not clear is when 𝗼? > 1−?. 
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper I presented three models of income-hiding between household members when one 
spouse has an information advantage regarding the quantity of resources available to the household. 
I show the conditions that must be met for income hiding to occur in equilibrium, and find that 
income hiding is more likely to occur under certain contractual arrangements than others depending 
on who has control over resources. In general, my results indicate that income-hiding is more likely 
to occur in a household with a housekeeping allowance contract, relative to both, an independent 
management and a pooling household. A pooling household is the least likely to observe hiding, as 
long as the spouse without the information advantage has no dictatorial power. Furthermore, I find 
that in equilibrium, a spouse with an information advantage in a pooling household chooses to hide 
the transfer if the change in bargaining power associated with informing her spouse is not significant 
enough to compensate for the loss in discretionary expenditure that results from the bargaining 
process. In particular, there exists a strictly positive threshold of change in bargaining power needed 
to induce revelation, and the threshold is decreasing on the wife‘s initial power.  
The implication is that when income is unobserved, and if spouses use their information 
advantage, inefficiencies are likely to arise. This is because when hiding income, the spouse with the 
information advantage is forced to allocate those resources to goods that cannot easily be monitored 31 
 
by  his  or  her  spouse,  and  thus  household  public  goods  can  be  underprovided.  In  developing 
countries, where resources are limited, this can function as a poverty trap, where spouses under-
invest in their children. 
 
 
8.  Appendix: Proofs 
 
 
8.1  Proof of Proposition 1: 
 
Equation (5) implies that ?? = 0 for some ?? > 0 as long as 
?′ ??  < ? ?′ 𝑌 ?                    (P1.1) 
If 𝑌 ? = 0 (P1.1) holds because it was assumed that both goods are normal, ?′(0) = ∞. If 𝑌 ? = 𝑌 ? , 
from the concavity assumption it follows that ?′ 𝑌 ?  < ?′ 𝑌 ? − ??? . But equation (6) implies that 
?′ ??  = ? ?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  therefore: 
?′ 𝑌 ?  < ?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ ??               (P1.2) 
Furthermore ? 𝑌 ?  is increasing in Yf.Therefore there exists a unique 𝑌 ?   ∈  0,𝑌 ? . Likewise, since 
the problem is symmetric there exists a unique 𝑌 ?      ∈  0,𝑌 ? . ∎ 
 
8.2  Proof of Proposition 2: 
Given that the problem is symmetric, it suffices to derive the comparative statics only for a change 
in Yf which is also the comparative statistic of interest for the propositions that follow. 
Case (i): If 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?        ∈  0,𝑌?  thus ?? = 0 and ?? = 𝑌 ? so the value of ?? is obtained from spouse 
m’s optimization condition (5).  
?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ ??               (P2.1) 
Note that Qm does not depend on Yf, and neither does xm, therefore the only variable that 
changes with Yf is xf. 
Case  (ii):  If  𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌?   thus  ?? = 0,  so  the  value  of  ??  is  obtained  from  spouse  f’s 
optimization condition (6) 
??′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ ??               (P2.2) 
Differentiating (P2.2) and f’s budget constraint with respect to Yf yields the results stated in the 




??′′  ?? 




?′′  ?? 
?′′  ?? +?2?′′  ??  > 0              (P2.4) 
𝜕??
𝜕𝑌?
= 0                  (P2.5) 
𝜕??
𝜕𝑌?




8.3  Proof of Proposition 3: 
Given that the problem is symmetric, it suffices to derive the comparative statics only for a change 
in Yf which is also the comparative statistic of interest for the propositions that follow. If 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?   
and 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     .then ??,?? > 0, and the equilibrium allocations are obtained by solving the following 
system for Qm and Qf: 
?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ ?? + ??         (P3.1) 
The results in the proposition are obtained from totally differentiating the system in (P3.1). In matrix 
form: 
 
?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ??  ?′′ ? 




  =  
??′′ ??  0





Let J denote determinant of the Hessian which is equal to: 
𝐽 = ??? 
?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ??  ?′′ ? 
?′′ ?  ?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ?? 
   
    =  ?′′ ?  ?′′ ??  + ?′′ ??   + ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ??   > 0        (P3.2) 




??′′ ? ?′′ ?? +?3?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 




?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 




??′′ ? ?′′  ?? 




?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
𝐽 > 0              (P3.6) 
 
8.4  Proof of Proposition 4: 
Assumptions: 
(i)  Spouse m can observe the transfer with probability zero. 
(ii)  The household public good is perfectly observable, such that spouse m can infer that a 
transfer has occurred and thus adjust his contribution accordingly.  
(iii)  Spouse f’s private consumption, or discretionary expenditure, is not monitored by m.  
If  f  chooses  to  reveal  the  transfer  and  𝑌 ? + ? > 𝑌 ?    and  𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?       (i.e.  both  spouses  are  making 
positive contributions to the public good) the demands are obtained from solving the following 
system of equations: 
??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ???  = ??′ 𝑌 ? − ???  = ?′ ?? + ??         (P4.1) 
If f receives a transfer T and decides to reveal it, the change in ??,??,??,?? per unit change in T are 
equivalent to those corresponding to changes in Yf described in Proposition 2.  
















𝐽  ?3?′′ ??   ?′′ ??     +
?′ ??   
𝐽  ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ??     (P4.2) 
 
If f decides to hide the transfer and 𝑌 ? + ? > 𝑌 ?   and 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     , then f spends all the transfer on 
private consumption and f‗s household good contribution doesn‘t change compared to before the 
transfer, nor do m’s allocations. So it must be that ? ??  < ? ??    < ? ??       ????? ??     = ?? + ? 
where ?? is the pre-transfer private consumption optimal allocation and ??   is the post-transfer 
private consumption optimal allocation if the transfer is revealed.  





=  ?′ ??                    (P4.3) 






𝐽  ?3?′′ ??   ?′′ ??     +
?′ ??   
𝐽  ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ??     < ?′ ??      =  𝜕??
𝜕?  
??
   (P4.4) 
Simplifying the above expression: 
?2?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    ?′ ?  − ??′ ??      + ??′′ ? ?′′ ??    ?′′ ??    − ?′ ??     < ??′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??      (P4.5) 
Taking into account f’s FOC ??′ ??    = ?′ ? , f hides if: 
 ?′ ??    − ?′ ??      ?2?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    + ?′′ ? ?′′ ??     < ?′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??         (P4.6) 
This yields the condition that must be met for f to hide the transfer, and it can be re-written as: 
 ?′ ??    − ?′ ??      ?2 ?′′  ??    
?′′  ?  +
?′′  ??    
?′′  ??     < ?′ ??               (P4.7) 
 
The left hand side of (P4.7) is positive due to the concavity assumption ?′ ??    > ?′ ??     because 
??   < ??    . Such that, the decision to hide depends on the relative change in marginal utility of private 
and public consumption for both household members, and on the size of the transfer.  
Consider the extreme case where f doesn‘t hide and allocates all of the transfer towards the 
household public good, such that ? = ???. As the transfer increases (? → ∞), lim?→∞ ?′ ??    =
lim?→∞ ?′ 𝑌? + ? − ???  = lim?→∞ ?′ 𝑌? + ? − ?  = ?′ 𝑌? .  If  she  does  hide,  then  her  only 
option  is  to  allocate  it  towards  private  consumption  to  avoid  detection,  thus  lim?→∞ ?′ ??    =
lim?→∞ ?′ ?? + ?  = ?′ ∞  → 0. The right-hand side of (P4.7) is positive and the left-hand side 
tends to zero (cannot be equal to zero by assumption), so in this case revealing would be the 
equilibrium.  
Now  consider the  other extreme case  where  the transfer tends to zero. If  f reveals the 
transfer:  lim?→0 ?′ ??    = lim?→0 ?′ 𝑌? + ? − ???  = ?′ ?? ,  if  she  hides  it  lim?→0 ?′ ??    =
lim?→0 ?′ ?? + ?  = ?′ ?? , so (P4.7) simplifies to 0 < ?′ ?? . Thus there exists a threshold level of 
transfer (?  ) such that for any ? < ?   the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is to hide. 
 
 
8.5  Proof of Proposition 5: 
First, it is important to show that (14) binds. Let Q=0, then (14) implies: 
?′ 0  < ??′ 𝑌 ? + ?                    (P5.1) 
But by assumption ?′ 0  = ∞, so (14) binds and Q>0. 
Equation (18) implies that s=0 for some Q>0 as long as: 
???′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  < ?′ 𝑌 ?                  (P5.2) 
Which only holds iff ? < 0. We have shown that (14) binds, therefore the constraint on m’s problem 
binds as well, so ? ≠ 0. Since Q>0, from (17) we know: 
?′ ?  = ? ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  + ?′′ ?               (P5.3) 
Which, given the concavity assumption, is only possible if ? < 0. 
If 𝑌 ? = 0, (P5.2) holds because ?′ 0  = ∞.   
???′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  < ?′ 0                  (P5.4) 
If 𝑌 ? = 𝑌 ?, due to the concavity assumption we know that ?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  > ?′ 𝑌 ? , and from (14) 
and (17) we know that: 34 
 
??′ 𝑌 ? − ??  = ?′ ?  = ? ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  + ?′′ ?           (P5.5) 
So, 
??′ 𝑌 ?  < ??′ 𝑌 ? − ??  = ? ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  + ?′′ ?           (P5.6) 
So, following from (18), and multiplying (P5.4) by p on both sides: 
??2?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  < ??′ 𝑌 ?  < ? ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? − ??  + ?′′ ?         (P5.7) 
As long as ??′′ ?  → 0, (P5.7) will not hold. When ??′′ ?  ≠ 0, it will generally not hold, even 
though for a small interval, it is possible that (P5.7) holds. 
 
8.6  Proof of Proposition 6: 
It suffices to derive the comparative statics only for a change in Yf which is also the comparative 
statistic of interest for the propositions that follow. 
If 𝑌 ? ≤ 𝑌?      ∈  0,𝑌?  thus ? = 0, so the value of ? is obtained from (14) 
?′ ?  − ??′ 𝑌 ? − ??  ≤ 0                  (P6.1) 
Differentiating (P6.1) and f’s budget constraint with respect to Yf yields the results stated in the 




??′′  ?? 




?′′  ? 
?′′  ? +?2?′′ ??  > 0                (P6.3) 
 
8.7  Proof of Proposition 7: 
If 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?     .thus ?,? > 0.  
Solving (17) and (18) for ? and substituting in, yields the following system for s and Q: 
?′ 𝑌 ? − ?  ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  + ?′′ ?   − ??′ ? ?′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  = 0   (P7.1) 
??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  − ?′ ?  = 0   
Totally differentiating the system in (P7.1): 
 
−?3?′ ?? ?′′′ ??  − ?′ ?? ?′′′ ?  − ??′′ ? ?′′ ??  + ?2?′ ? ?′′′ ??  −?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ??  + ?2?′ ?? ?′′′ ??  − ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?  − ??′ ? ?′′′ ?? 
?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ??  −??′′ ?? 
  ??
??
   
 
=  
??′ ? ?′′′ ??  − ?
2?′ ?? ?′′′ ??  −?
2?′′ ?? ?′′ ??  − ?′′ ?? ?′′ ? 




   
Let D denote determinant of the Hessian which is equal to: 
? = ??? 
−?3?′ ?? ?′′′ ??  − ?′ ?? ?′′′ ?  − ??′′ ? ?′′ ??  + ?2?′ ? ?′′′ ??  −?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ??  + ?2?′ ?? ?′′′ ??  − ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?  − ??′ ? ?′′′ ?? 
?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ??  −??′′ ?? 
   
= ?′′ ??  ?2?′′ ??  + ?′′ ?  
2
+ ??′′ ? ?′′′ ??  ?′ ?  − ??′ ??   − ??′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
2
< 0 
                        (P7.2) 




?3?′′  ?? ?′′  ?? 
2
+??′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′  ? 




?2?′′  ?? ?′′  ?? ?′′ ? +?′′ ?? ?′′  ? 2




?2?′′  ?? ?′′ ? 2+?′′  ?? ?′′  ?? ?′′ ? 





??′ ?? ?′′  ?? ?′′′  ? −??′′  ? ?′′′  ??  ?′ ? −??′ ??  −?2?′′ ? ?′′  ?? 
2
? < 0  if    ??′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′′ ?  >
??′′ ? ?′′′ ??  ?′ ?  − ??′ ??   + ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 




?′′  ??  ?2?′′ ?? +?′′  ?  
2




??′ ?? ?′′  ?? ?′′′  ? −??′′  ? ?′′′  ??  ?′ ? −??′ ??  −?2?′′ ? ?′′  ?? 
2
? > 0        (P7.8) 
 
8.8  roof of Proposition 8: 
Assumptions: 
(i)  Spouse m can observe the transfer with probability zero. 
(ii)  The household public good is perfectly observable such that spouse m can infer that a 
transfer has occurred and thus adjust his contribution accordingly.  
(iii)  Spouse f’s private consumption, or discretionary expenditure, is not monitored by m.  
If f chooses to reveal the transfer and 𝑌 ? > 𝑌 ?      the demands are obtained from solving the following 
system of equations: 
?′ 𝑌 ? − ?  ?2?′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  + ?′′ ?   − ??′ ? ?′′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  = 0   (P8.1) 
??′ 𝑌 ? + ? − ??  − ?′ ?  = 0   
Thus, if f receives a transfer T and decides to reveal it, the change in ?,?,??,?? per unit change in T 
are equivalent to those corresponding to changes in Yf described in proposition 7.  












𝜕?                      (P8.2) 
              =
?′ ? 
?  ?3?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
2
+ ??′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?   +
?′ ??   
?  ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ? 2 + ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?    





?′ ??   
?  ?4?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
2
+ ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ? 2 + ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?     
 
If f decides to hide the transfer then  f spends all the transfer on private consumption and the 
household good allocation doesn‘t change compared to before the transfer, nor do m’s allocations. 
So  it  must  be  that  ? ??  < ? ??    < ? ??       ????? ??     = ?? + ?  where  ??  is  the  pre-transfer 
private consumption optimal allocation and ??   is the post-transfer private consumption optimal 





=  ?′ ??                      (P8.3) 





?′ ??   
?  ?4?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
2
+ ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ? 2 + ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?   <
                   ?′ ??    =  𝜕??
𝜕?  
??                   (P8.4) 
Multiplying through by D<0, 
?′ ??    ?4?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
2
+ ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ?? ?′′ ? 2 + ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?   >
  ?′ ??      ?′′ ??  ?2?′′ ??  + ?′′ ?  
2
+ ??′′ ? ?′′′ ??  ?′ ?  − ??′ ??   − ??′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
2
   
Which simplifies to, 36 
 
 ?′ ??    − ?′ ??     ?′′ ??  ?2?′′ ??  + ?′′ ?  
2
>
 ?′ ??    ??′′ ? ?′′′ ??  ?′ ?  − ??′ ??   − ??′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′′ ?  + ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
2
     (P8.6) 
Recall from (P7.6) that,  
𝜕?
𝜕𝑌?
< 0  if   ??′ ?? ?′′ ?? ?′′′ ?  > ??′′ ? ?′′′ ??  ?′ ?  − ??′ ??   + ?2?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
2   
So,  when 
𝜕?
𝜕𝑌?
> 0  (P8.6)  doesn‘t  hold  because  left-hand-side  is  negative  and  right-hand-side  is 
positive,  so  f  never  hides  the  transfer.  However,  when 
𝜕?
𝜕𝑌?
< 0  both  sides  of  the  equation  are 
negative, and the decision to reveal depends on relative preferences and the size of the transfer. 
Consider the extreme case where f doesn‘t hide and allocates all of the transfer towards the 
household public good, such that ? = ???. As the transfer increases (? → ∞), lim?→∞ ?′ ??    =
lim?→∞ ?′ 𝑌? + ? + ? − ??  = lim?→∞ ?′ 𝑌? + ? + ? − ?  = ?′ 𝑌? + ? .  If  she  does  hide,  then 
her  only  option  is  to  allocate  it  towards  private  consumption  to  avoid  detection,  thus 
lim?→∞ ?′ ??    = lim?→∞ ?′ ?? + ?  = ?′ ∞  → 0. The right-hand side of (P8.6) is negative and the 
left-hand side tends to zero, so in this case the equilibrium would be not to hide.  
Now  consider the  other extreme case  where  the transfer tends to zero. If  f reveals the 
transfer: lim?→0 ?′ ??    = lim?→0 ?′ 𝑌? + ? + ? − ???  = ?′ ?? , if she hides it lim?→0 ?′ ??    =
lim?→0 ?′ ?? + ?  = ?′ ?? , so (P8.6) simplifies to 0 > ?′ ?? , which always holds. Thus there exists 




8.9  Proof of Proposition 9: 
Totally differentiating the equations in (27) yields the following system of equations: 
 
??′′ ??  +  1 − ? ?′′ ??  ? 1 − ? ?′′ ?? 




  =  
 1 − ? ?′′ ??  −?′ ??  − ?′ ?? 
? 1 − ? ?′′ ??  −??′′ ?? 
  
?𝑌
??    
Let the determinant of the Hessian be denoted by D, where 
D =?
2? 1 − ? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ??  + ??′′ ? ?′′ ??  + 1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??  > 0      (P9.1) 
Comparative statics reveal that, 
𝜕?
𝜕𝑌 =
?? 1−? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
? > 0                  (P9.2) 
𝜕??
𝜕𝑌 =
 1−? ?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
? > 0                  (P9.3) 
𝜕??
𝜕? = −
?′ ?? ?′′ ? +?2 1−? ?′ ?? ?′′ ?? +?′ ?? ?′′ ? 
? > 0            (P9.4) 
𝜕?
𝜕? =
−???′ ?? ?′′ ?? +? 1−? ?′ ?? ?′′ ?? 
? < 0   if   ??′ ?? ?′′ ??  >  1 − ? ?′ ?? ?′′ ??   (P9.5) 
𝜕??
𝜕𝑌 =
??′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
? > 0                    (P9.6) 
𝜕??
𝜕? = −
?? 1−? ?′′ ?? ?′′ ?? + 1−? ?′′ ? ?′′ ?? 
? < 0              (P9.7) 
 
 
8.10  Proof of Proposition 10: 
Assumptions: 
(i)  Spouse m can observe the transfer with probability zero. 37 
 
(ii)  The decisions to reveal the transfer and to bargain under asymmetric information are 
equivalent. 
(iii)  The transfer changes bargaining power through the change in the threat point specified 
by the non-cooperative equilibria in 5.1. 
(iv)  Spouse f’s private consumption is not monitored by spouse m.  
If f chooses to reveal the transfer the demands are obtained by solving (26) for T>0: Thus, if f 
receives a transfer T and decides to reveal it, the change in  ?,??,?? per unit change in T are 
equivalent to those corresponding to changes in Yf described in Proposition 9. The change in utility 



























?  ?? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    +  ? 1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??    − ???′ ??   ?′′ ??    
𝜕?
𝜕?    +
                  
?′ ??   
?   1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    −  ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  + ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  + ?2 1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??    
𝜕?
𝜕?   





??? ′ ??   
?  ?? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    +  ? 1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??    − ???′ ??   ?′′ ??    
𝜕?
𝜕?    +
                  
?′ ??   
?   1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    −  ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  + ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  + ?2 1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??    
𝜕?
𝜕?   
 
If  f  hides  then  she  allocates  T  towards  private  consumption  and  neither  household  good 
consumption nor m’s private consumption change compared to before the transfer. So it must be 
that  ? ??  < ? ??    < ? ??       ????? ??     = ?? + ?  where  ??  is  the  pre-transfer  private 
consumption optimal allocation and ??   is the post-transfer private consumption optimal allocation if 




=  ?′ ??                      (P11.2) 







                 (P11.3) 





? ?′ ??      ???′′ ? ?′′ ??    + ?2? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    +  1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??     − ??2 1 −
? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    −  1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??               (P11.4) 
Where, 
? = ?2?  1 − ? ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ??    − ??′ ??   ?′ ??   ?′′ ??     −  ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ?  + ?′ ??   ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  +
?2 1 − ? ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ??     > 0. Note that even if p is small, M is positive: lim?→0 ? = − ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ?  +
?′ ??   ?′ ??   ?′′ ?   > 0 because v’’<0 and u’’<0 by assumption. 
Whether there exists a strictly positive threshold change in bargaining power such that f hides is 
given by, 
?′ ??    ???′′ ? ?′′ ??    + ?2? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    +  1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??     −
? 1 − ? ?′ ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    −  1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    > 0         (P11.5) 
Which simplifies to, 
??′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    > 
?2? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    ??′ ??    − ?′ ??     +  1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    ?′ ??    − ?′ ??          (P11.6) 38 
 
Note  that  since  that  ? ??  < ? ??    < ? ??       the  assumption  on  decreasing  marginal  utility  to 
consumption implies that ?′ ??  > ?′ ??    > ?′ ??      thus, the second term in (P11.6) is negative 
and the third term is positive. So unless the bargaining power ―tax‖ in the utility derived from 
private expenditure is high enough the third term in (P11.6) is positive, thus making (P11.6) positive 
and so the threshold bargaining power change is greater than zero below which f hides the transfer.  
 
8.11  Proof of Corollary 1: 
It follows from Proposition 10 that the change in bargaining power associated to income-hiding 






 ?′ ??      ???′′ ? ?′′ ??    + ?2? 1 − ? ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    +  1 − ? ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    
− ??2 1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ??   ?′′ ??    −  1 − ? ?′ ??   ?′′ ? ?′′ ??     
Where:  ? = ?2?  1 − ? ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ??    − ??′ ??   ?′ ??   ?′′ ??     −  ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ?  + ?′ ??   ?′ ??   ?′′ ?  +
?2 1 − ? ?′ ??   
2
?′′ ??    .  




 ?′ ??      −?′ ??    ?′′ ? ?′′ ??    
−?′ ??   
2
?′′ ? −?′ ??   ?′ ??    ?′′  ? −?2?′ ??   
2
?′′ ??     > 0  




?′ ??      ?′′ ? ?′′ ??   
??′ ??   ?′ ??    ?′′ ??   −?′ ??   
2
?′′ ? −?′ ??   ?′ ??    ?′′  ?  < 0.  
implying that the threshold change in bargaining power is decreasing in the initial level of bargaining 
power. 
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